The Democratic Public Domain: Reconnecting the Modern First Amendment and the Original
Progress Clause (a.k.a. Copyright and Patent Clause)
by Malla Pollack1
Introduction
Professor Balkin’s call for a First Amendment jurisprudence fit for a digital age2 silently
reinvokes the usually overlooked original meaning of U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8. This essay demonstrates how the Court’s delay in interpreting the Constitution led to a
serious misreading.
I invite you to enter the world of what should-have-been by simply reading the
Constitution. Axiomatically, when reading statutes, one starts with the text and reads each
section in context. The Constitution is not always treated as sensibly.3 This short essay
demonstrates the interesting outcome of actually reading Article One, Section Eight, Clause
Eight (a.k.a. the Progress Clause, a.k.a. the Copyright and Patent Clause) in pari materia with the
First Amendment. If the Progress Clause had been construed when its original meaning was still
obvious, United States law would be far different. In this area at least, the Drafters’ Constitution
was much less aristocratic than the modern (mis)reading. The original meaning of the Progress
Clause, furthermore, should have stimulated a more communitarian First Amendment, the type of
First Amendment currently being suggested by leading First Amendment scholars such as Jack
Balkin.4
This article does not make the radical claim that the United States should jettison all
departures from the public original meaning of the Progress Clause. However, we should
question those departures and carefully consider any further out migration.
I. Reading the Original Text
The words in Article One, Section Eight, Clause Eight read: “Congress shall have the
power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
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Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law. My thanks to Diane Zimmerman for
sparking this piece by sharing a draft of her case intensive article Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One
View of the Public Domain, forthcoming [need to update] (draft on file with author). Special thanks as well to
Edward C. Walterscheid for his learned criticism of earlier drafts. This piece merely sets out a general theory. Full
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See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the
Information Society, Yale Law School Public Law Working Paper No. 63, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=470842 (visited Feb. 14, 2004), forthcoming New York Univ. L. Rev. (arguing that
Internet changes focus of First Amendment from the right of a few privileged speakers, such as broadcasters, to
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For example, consider Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.
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See, e.g, Balkin, supra note 2.

to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]5
Oddly, for over two hundred years no one performed any scholarly research on the 1789
American meaning of the word ‘progress.’ Early readers knew; later readers (mis)assumed.
As my historical research has demonstrated, the word “progress” in the 1789 United
States meant geographical movement, spread, dissemination.6 If asked to quickly finish the
phrase “the progress of the _________,” a 1789 American would have said “fire.” Fire spreads
in all directions. A spreading fire is a bad thing, not an inherent part of social advancement.
Similarly, 1789 Americans spoke of the ‘progress’ of devastating hoards of insects, the
‘progress’ of epidemic diseases, and trying to halt the ‘progress’ of invading troops. Asking
how many of the 1789 residents of the United States believed in what 1850 Americans called
“the Idea of Progress,” i.e. that the world was getting better, or that such betterment was a natural
process (divine or scientific), is not the same as asking the meaning or usage of the word
‘progress’ in the United States of 1789.7
Even in the 1780s, the word ‘progress’ was used sometimes by some (usually highly
educated) speakers to mean “qualitative improvement.” That meaning seemed to be slipping into
elite usage from the French. That meaning, however, does not work in the Progress Clause.
First, it renders part of the Clause redundant. As a legislative goal, “promoting the improvement
of knowledge” is no different than “promoting knowledge.” More importantly, ‘science’ in the
eighteen century included the study of moral philosophy; no sane politician in 1787 America
would have burdened a controversial referendum with the implication that mere humans could
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For a full discussion of the evidence and logic underlying this claim, see Malla Pollack, What is Congress
Supposed to Promote? Defining “Progress” in Article One, Section Eight, Clause Eight of the United States
Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 Neb. L. Rev. 754 (2001)(actually published fall 2002). But see
Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science, 36 Loyola L.A. 1, 45 (2002)
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progressed to cover the whole table.” Id. at 45. Solum, is ignoring fire, insects, and diseases. I also disagree with
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but firmly disagree. See also Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loyola L. Rev. 611, 611-614
(admitting that Paul Best and H. Jefferson Powell’s critiques of subjective originalism are both “familiar and widely
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improve on Jesus’ moral teachings.8 In sum, the Progress Clause sets Congress the goal of
promoting the distribution of knowledge and new technology among the populace.9
Diffusion, the Progress Clause’s immediate goal, should lead to the quality improvement
of human society and the human knowledge base – the now-assumed meaning of ‘progress.’
The original Progress Clause rests on the assumption that social betterment is triggered by wide
dissemination of knowledge and technology. This spread-education theory of social
improvement is a core doctrine of the early Enlightenment; the inevitability of social
improvement depends on disseminating learning, skills, information, power, and property
throughout the globe, and throughout the population of each nation state. Improvement in
human knowledge and behavior is assured by natural processes if, and only if, learning is shared
with all. Improvement is inevitable if one (1) fixes thought in writing10 (thus making it shareable
at a distance in time and space), and then (2) teaches all homo sapiens to read (thus including all
humankind in the quest for better understanding). Social improvement is the inevitable outcome
of including all humans in the quest. Then, and only then, any group’s stumbles have little power
to halt the specie’s forward journey. 11 The early Enlightenment “Idea of Progress” was not
aristocratic. Faith in the future was not based on faith in a few super-achievers.12
Consider the contrasting, aristocratic slant of the English Statute of Anne, enacted for
“the encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful books.”13 Even if the general
populace is illiterate, ill informed, and unheard on the issues of the day, learned men can
continue to write useful books. Learning may improve with such a policy because the most
informed persons in the society will push the frontiers of human knowledge. However, this
aristocratic approach to social improvement is not what the original language of the Constitution
supports.14
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2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1119 (discussing).
10

The 1976 Copyright Act is, therefore, quite proper to begin copyright at fixation. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works or authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression ....”)
(emphasis added).
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Fear of such a society was presumably behind the public attacks on Richard J. Herrnstein & Charles Murray, The
Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (Free Press pbk ed. 1995). The Bell Curve describes

Fleshing out the words in the Progress Clause, it allows Congress to give15 authors shortterm exclusive rights in their writings (that is in the expressions with which non-protected ideas
and facts are dressed) in order to promote the distribution of ideas and facts (‘science,’ currently
called knowledge). ‘Authors’ is a very broad term, properly not limited to originators of literary
works.16 Contrastingly, Congress may give inventors short-term rights over their discoveries (not
just their explication of these discoveries). Technology protection, however, is limited to
improvements. I agree with the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the words “inventors” and
“discoveries” requires patents be granted only when the alleged invention is a noticeable
advancement over prior technology,17 “nonobvious to a person of ordinary skill” in the relevant
“art.”18 The Clause is a limit on Congress, thus demonstrating that the base right is in the public
the United States as controlled by an elite which is superior in all of education, intelligence, money, and power – a
separately living elite which fears the under classes it rules. See id. at 509-25.
15

I accept the Court’s choice of possible 1789 definitions for “secure.” See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Peters)
591, 661-62 (1834) (choosing to read “secure” to give Congress the power to create exclusive rights for authors, as
opposed to making existing rights safer). As the Court points out, while some eighteenth century lawyers had argued
for common law rights for authors, no one seemingly believed inventors had been protected by similar common law
rights. Johnson’s definitions of the verb “to secure,” do not focus on whether the res secured preexists the security.
See II Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 1732 (1978 Librarie du Liban facsimile reprint of
1773 ed.). Johnson’s first definition of “to secure,” includes “to make certain, to put out of hazard, to ascertain.” Id.
Johnson illustrates this meaning, inter alia, with the following quotation from Locke:
Actions have their preference, not according to the transient pleasure or pain that accompnaies or follows
them here, but as they serve to secure that perfect durable happiness hereafter.
Id. I cannot make sense of this Lockian explanation on the theory that “secure” may only refer to making safe
preexisting res.
16 For example, God was termed the author of the world and Satan the author of both sin and death. See John
Milton, Paradise Lost, in The Poetical Works of John Milton 1, 173, 219, 222 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1961).
“Author,” like most words, had multiple dictionary definitions in the late eighteenth century. Johnson lists four:
1. “The first beginner or mover of any thing; he to whom any thing owes its original.”
2. “The efficient; he that effects or produces any thing.”
3. “The first writer of any thing; distinct from the translator or compiler.”
4. “A writer in general.”
I Johnson, supra note 15, at 133 (emphasis in original). Walterscheid prefers the last two of these definitions as more
in keeping with Madison’s and Pinkney’s respective suggestions to the constitutional drafting convention for some
type of protection to “literary authors” or “authors.” See Edward C. Walterscheid, Divergent Evolution of the Patent
Power and the Copyright Power, forthcoming IDEA at 36 (draft on file with author). Walterscheid also relies on
Johnson’s definitions of “writing.” See id.
To my knowledge, no one has performed empirical research on the actual use of the words “authors” and
“writings” in the 1789 United States. Since the wide meaning follows one available 1789 definition, comports with
current legal practice, and seems to fulfill the general purpose of the Clause, I forebear currently from challenging
the Court’s choice of meanings for this word at this time.
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“Useful arts” means technology, and excludes both commerce and the learned professions. See, e.g., John R.
Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 1139, 1169-75 (1999) (discussing); Malla
Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents, 28 Rutgers Comp. & Tech. L.J. 61, 86-91
(2002) (same).
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See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (holding that this wording in the 1952 Patent Act represents a
constitutionally required standard). But see Edward C. Walterscheid, “Within the Limits of the Constitutional

(not in the government, the inventors, or the writers). The Clause bars some government actions
by negative implication,19 but does not go so far as to prevent use of the spending power to
reward authors or inventors.20
Recognizing the original meaning of the Progress Clause explains why the Drafters did
not acknowledge any tension between the Progress Clause and the First Amendment. Since
copyright statutes would be enacted only to encourage the dissemination of knowledge, copyright
was not allied with censorship. Quite the opposite, the Progress Clause should be viewed as the
pre-First Amendment First Amendment. The dissemination reading of the Progress Clause,
therefore, makes sense of James Madison’s championship of a Constitution without a bill of
rights even though “[a] popular government without popular information [] or the means of
acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy or perhaps both.”21
The Drafters were not being obtuse or hypocritical, they merely defined the word
‘progress’ differently than we do. Nor did they have any need to discuss the then-obvious
meaning of a common word during the ratification debates. No wonder the Progress Clause did
not raise Anti-Federalist hackles. No wonder the Progress Clause was barely mentioned in the
ratification brouhaha.22 Since Congress was empowered only to enact copyright statutes which
disseminated knowledge, the Copyright power had no potential to support censorship.23 The
Grant”: Constitutional Limitations on the Patent Power, 9 J. Intel. Prop. L. 291, 318-28 (2002) (arguing against
constitutional basis for this requirement). As with “author,” I am not claiming that I have performed empirical
research on the 1789 common meaning of “inventors” or “discoveries.” I have not yet done so and know of no one
who has. Since the Court’s choice of definitions is within those possible and seems to mesh well with the policy
behind the Clause, I choose not to challenge these definitions at this time.
19

See Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestibility, 18 Seattle Univ. L. Rev. 259, 270-326 (1995) (discussing
negative implication at length).
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See Walterscheid, supra note 6 [Anatomy] (agreeing that Congress may use Spending Power to promote science
and art). Some comments in the first session of Congress, however, raise doubt that Congress may encourage
science by any action other than providing the inventor with limited rights to exclude. See Remarks of Rep. Tucker
during discussion of possible funding for exploration of Baffin’s Bay, in 10 Documentary History of the First Federal
Congress of the United States at 211-20 (Linda De Pauw et al. Eds. 1977).
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Letter from James Madison to W.T. Berry (Aug. 4, 1822), in James Madison, The Complete Madison 337 (Saul
K. Padover ed., 1953).
22

See Malla Pollack, Purveyance and Power or Over-Priced Free Lunch: The Intellectual Property Clause as an
Ally of the Takings Clause in the Public’s Control of Government, 30 Southwestern Univ. L. Rev. 1, 99-116 (2000)
(published Oct. 2001) (discussing ratification).
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The early United States copyright statute was for a very short period, covered very few types of works, and gave
copyright holders very limited exclusive rights. See Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124. In censorship potential, it
was nothing like the current content of Title 17 of the United States Code. Similarly, since Congress could only
grant patents that disseminated improved technology, the Progress Clause was not a replay of English law before the
Statute of Monopolies. See generally, Malla Pollack, Purveyance and Power or Over-Priced Free Lunch: The
Intellectual Property Clause as an Ally of the Takings Clause in the Public’s Control of Government, 30
Southwestern Univ. L. Rev. 1 (2000) (published Oct. 2001) (providing detailed historical account of relationship
between Statute of Monopolies and the Progress Clause).

distributive function of the Progress Clause meshes with the democratic discussion theory of the
First Amendment. In this sense, copyright is correctly viewed as an engine of free expression.24
However, recognizing the full force of distribution includes recognizing that free expression is
not only for leaders. All persons partake in distribution and, hopefully, share in the selfrealization aspects of speech.25
The original congruence between the First Amendment and the Progress Clause is not
visible in the case law because the First Amendment (and the Progress Clause) remained
judicially unconstrued as the every day meaning of words changed, especially the word
‘progress.’ The so-called ‘Idea of Progress’ (axiomatically invoked in the nineteenth century
United States to legitimize destroying the natural environment, over working wage employees,
invading neighboring states, giving public land to railroad companies owned by robber barons,
and decimating the native population) is a completely different concept than the belief in natural
improvement through universal education. The later “Idea of Progress” evokes the triumph of
the most economically astute, social Darwinism, the rule of a small band of natural aristocrats.
Turgot and Condorcet would not have recognized this perverse mutation of their theory of social
improvement through universal education and universal empowerment.
The dissemination reading of the Progress Clause centralizes the now-beleaguered public
domain.26 The default position (absent optional statutes)27 is that all humans have the right to
use written or publicly practiced knowledge.28 They are common owners in a shared resource
pool, a resource pool which grows best when shared,29 a network.30 They (not Congress) own
the public domain in the Lockian sense that each person has the right not to be excluded.31 The
24

See Eldred v. Ascroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (quoting Harper & Row Publ. v. Nation Entrs., 471 U.S. 539,
558 (1985) (describing copyright as an engine of free expression)).
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See Balkin, supra note 2, at 11-15 (explaining how Internet empowers more people to fashion culture by routing
around or gloming on mass media).
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For a fuller explication, see Malla Pollack, The Owned Public Domain: The Constitutional Right Not to Be
Excluded– or the Supreme Court Chose the Right Breakfast Cereal in Kellogg v. National Biscuit Co., 22 Hastings
Comm/Ent L.J. 265 (2000). As per David Lange, “I am interested in the public domain as an affirmative source of
entitlements capable of deployment, as when and where required, against the encroachments upon the creative
imagination threatened by intellectual property.” David Lange, Reimaging the Public Domain, 66 (1&2) L. &
Contemp. Probls. 463, 476 (2003).
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The Progress Clause gives Congress the power to pass statutes. It does not require their enactment.
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A thinker or inventor could prevent sharing by preserving secrecy.

29 Do not let the drift between ‘property’ and ‘rights’ confuse; the rights/property dichotomy was created after the
Drafters’ era. See John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U.
Chic. L. Rev. 49 (1996).
30

See, e.g, Mark Lemley, The Legal Implications of Network Effects, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 479 (1998) (explaining how
networks become more valuable to each member as membership increases).
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See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Treatise One § 193 (defining property as something “that without
a Man’s own consent it cannot be taken from him.”). As Balkin recognizes, Internet gloming on is “nonexclusive
appropriation.” Balkin, supra note 2, at 12 (emphasis in original).

author or inventor has earned some return both for his work and for his sharing, but an author or
inventor has no right to hoard his or her improvement if granted a reasonable remuneration.32
Congress may temporarily bar the public from using some writing or invention, but only if the
temporary exclusion promotes dissemination. Since the public, not Congress, owns the public
domain, retrospective extension of copyright holders’ power to exclude the public is an
illegitimate attack on the public’s rights.33
The dissemination reading of the Progress Clause renders central “limited times,” fair
use, and the idea/expression dichotomy. These doctrines are neither the grudged crumbs
supported by market failure theory,34 nor the distant, down-stream possible outcome of incentive
theory.35 L. Ray Patterson was correct, at core, copyright is a law of users rights.36
This democratic reading of the Progress Clause bears little resemblance to current case
law. Even when the Supreme Court issues pro-public domain decisions, the Court seems
motivated by a desire to protect competition, not the cultural autonomy of the general public.37
The Court’s fundamental misunderstanding is typified by its brush-off of the First Amendment
argument made by petitioners in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the recent failed attack on the Sono Bono
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John Witherspoon, James Madison’s mentor, taught that “the public” has certain rights over every person in
society. Society may demand that each person be useful, and has “a right to the discovery of useful inventions,
provided an adequate price be paid to the discoverer.” John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, in The
Selected Writings of John Witherspoon 152, 228 (Thomas Miller ed. 1990). Garry Wills interprets similarly the
following language in Hutchinson (whom Wills finds central to the Declaration of Independence). See Garry Wills,
Inventing America: Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence 250-55 (1978):
A like right we may justly assert to mankind as a system, and to every society of men, even before civil
government, to compel any person who has fallen upon any fortunate invention, of great necessity or use for
the preservation of life or for a great increase of human happiness, to divulge it upon reasonable terms.
2 Francis Hutchinson, A System of Moral Philosophy 109 (1755).
As a man cannot hoard useful ideas, he cannot destroy his own property if it is still useful to the community.
Francis Hutchinson, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy 246-47 (1747). This moral theory stands in obvious
tension with trade secret doctrine, but I leave that to a different article. But see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470 (1974) (finding no conflict between federal patent regime and state trade secret law).
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But see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (holding retrospective extension constitutional).
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But see Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 929-31 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that copying articles
from professional journals was not fair use because a market system had been organized allowing payment for such
copies). As for the idea/expression dichotomy and related merger doctrine, the Fifth Circuit needed to go en banc to
save the most obvious of applications, the wording of enacted law. See Veeck v. SBCCI, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (reversing panel affirmation of injunction preventing Internet posting of model building code as
enacted).
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But see Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207 (stating Congress “rationally credited projections that longer terms would
encourage copyright holders to invest in the restoration and public distribution of their works.”).
36
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See L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of User’s Rights (1991).

See, e.g.,Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000) (refusing to accept a forced
reading of the Lanham Act because “[c]onsumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition . . . by a rule
of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit...”).

Copyright Term Extension Act. The majority’s First Amendment was not concerned “when
speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.”38
The tie between dissemination and societal improvement mocks the current First
Amendment empowerment of speakers over listeners and of creative speakers over mere
repeaters. Many should be encouraged to repeat others’ speech. How else can the populace learn
about competing ideas and important facts? In the market place of ideas, as in the market place
for soda, repetition-based recognition and wide distribution are important keys to market
power.39
II. Outcomes of Reading the Original Text
How would the United States’ positive law have differed if the Supreme Court had
reached the Progress Clause when its original meaning was still clear?40
First, intellectual “property” may never have been born. Copyright and patent should
have been viewed as claims for payment, not property rules.41
Since dissemination is core, non-use is mis-use. Patent infringement should not be
enjoined if the patent holder is not practicing the invention, but rather wishes to suppress
38

See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. This concept has recently become a focus of academic consideration. See, e.g,
Zimmerman, supra note 1; see also e.g., Randall Bezanson, Speaking Though Others’ Voices, 38 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 983, 1110 (2003) (arguing that acts of speech selection should not receive First Amendment protection unless
inter alia the message communicated is the selector’s own message). See also Balkin, supra note 2, at 5 (“Even
when people repeat what others have said, their reiteration often carries an alteration in meaning or context.”).
39

This claim requires much further expansion, but not in this article. It undermines, for example, the standard
judicial noninterest in censorship by powerful private interests. CBS refused to sell Move-On time to air an antiBush commercial during broadcast of the Super Bowl. See “CBS Censors Ad,” at http://www.moveon.org/front/
(visited Feb. 12, 2004). CBS’s refusal to air is presumably protected by CBS’s First Amendment right “to decide for
[itself] the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression . . . .” Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641
(1994). Such legality clashes with the need for dissemination of multiple points of view in a representative polity.
See also, e.g., William Safire, The Five Sisters, NY Times op. ed. (Feb. 16, 2004) (attacking media consolidation;
“You don’t have to be a populist to want to stop this rush by ever-fewer entities to dominate both the content and the
conduit of what we see and hear and write and say.”). However, government intervention to preserve balance in free
speech seems to perversely empower the entity limited by the First Amendment. Additionally, scholarship needs a
better account of the relationship between free speech theory and artistic materials. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The
Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 Yale L.J. 1, 37-49 (2002) (positing a “freedom of
imagination” within the First Amendment). Rubenfeld’s theory, however, seems to protect only those who do their
own imagining.
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Of course, this analysis assumes that Congress would have followed the spirit of the Clause or that the Court
aggressively would have policed the Clause’s bounds. But see Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 (“We have stressed . . . that it
is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.”). The
Eldred Court never defined the term ‘progress.’
41

See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972) (providing classic explanation of difference between property rules and
liability rules). I say “claims for payment,” rather than the more standard “liability rule,” because I agree with David
Lange in disputing the tone of condemnation. See David Lange, Reimaging the Public Domain, 66 (1&2) L. &
Contemp. Probls. 463, 470 n. 22 (2003).

improved technology to enhance its own market position. A circuit split on this issue reached the
Supreme Court in 1908 in a case involving an improved machine for manufacturing paper bags.42
The Court refused defendant’s argument that the equitable remedy was damages, not an
injunction. The Court’s refusal was supported solely by the “property” nature of patents.43
Copyright non-use is more problematical. The decision of when to release a work to the
public is somewhat related to personality issues.44 However, not all works embody the copyright
holder’s personality in any meaningful sense. Perhaps the proper copyright rule would bar
injunctions on the equitable ground of non-use if, but only if, the work being suppressed is not
personal to the suppressing copyright holder; injunctions could issue despite non-use if the
allegedly infringed work was an autobiography,45 but not acircus poster, 46 a lamp base,47 or the
packaging of a tooth-whitening product.48 But what of works which are personal to multiple
persons?49 Hegelian objectification of the personal will in objects is possible only when the
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See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
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See id. at 424 (“It is his absolute property.”); id. at 425 (“[I]n the three last cited cases it was decided that patents
are property, and entitled to the same rights and sanctions as other property.”); id. at 429 (“[I]t is the privilege of any
owner of property to use it or not use it, without question of motive.”).
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See, e.g., Harper & Row Publs. v. Nation Enterp., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (holding that the unpublished nature
of a work is “critical element” of fair use analysis, because of “the author’s right to control the first public
appearance of his expression.”).
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See, e.g., Harper, 471 U.S. at 542 (former President Gerald Ford’s personal memoirs).
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See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (circus poster).
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See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (lamp base).
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See, e.g., Am. Direct Marketing v. Azad Int’l, 783 F. Supp. 84, 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[C]onclud[ing] that the
proper remedy for infringement of the copyright in the images on a package [of a tooth whitening system] which has
withstood a trade dress claim between the same parties [for lack of secondary meaning] is most likely a fee based on
the shown value of the image.”).
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As David Nimmer said of the secretive official group of scholars studying the Dead Sea Scrolls, “The committee,
with its obsessive secrecy and cloak and dagger scholarship, long ago exhausted its credibility with scholars and
laymen alike. The two Cincinnatians [who published a facsimile of the ancient text without permission] seem to
know what the scroll committee forgot: that the scrolls and what they say about the common roots of Christianity and
Rabbinic Judaism belong to civilization, not to a few sequestered professors.” David Nimmer, Copyright in the
Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 Houston L. Rev. 1, 64 (2001). But see Eisenman v. Qimron, C.A.
2790\93, 54(3) P.D. 817 (Isreali Supreme Court affirming judgement of copyright infringement against those
responsible for facsimile publication on the basis of Isreali law) (as discussed Nimmer, supra, at 72 (explaining that
case lacks an official English translation)). Despite the Isreali court’s ruling for the cartel, the illicit publication was
instrumental in gaining wider scholarly access to the material, thus resulting in a new “efflorescence” of related
work, see Nimmer, supra, at 76. I agree with Nimmer that copyright should not have existed under United States
law, though perhaps not with each detail of his analysis. See Nimmer, supra at 81.

specific property/object is not already the reification of another’s will.50 Whatever the
philosophical correctness of that position, it does not mesh with human-lived reality.51 One
obvious example, many persons have deep personal bonds to religious texts.52 Furthermore,
what of works disseminated for the purpose of exposing their fallacies?53 Even the current,
impoverished law of fair use is kindest to criticism.54
Second, down-stream uses must be protected from up-stream blockage. The anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Rights Act stand the Progress Clause on its
head.55 Pursuant to the dissemination reading, fair use should expansively limit not only
copyright but patent and all other “intellectual property.”56 Similarly, if the Progress Clause is
fully realized, derivative work rights would be enforceable only by payment of reasonable
royalties.57 A derivative work which does not earn a profit for its (re)creator would be
50

See, e.g. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Georgetown L.J. 287, 334 (1988) (claiming
that according to Hegel “the will can only occupy a res nullius – either a virgin object or something that has been
abandoned.”).

51

See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 18 Cardozo
AELJ 81, 82 (1998) (providing a more complex notion of possible personal ties to intellectual property res including
creativity, intentionality, and identification as source).
52

Religious materials have been central in many intellectual property disputes under many different theories. See,
e.g., Walter A. Effross, Owning Enlightenment: Proprietary Spirituality in the”New Age” Marketplace, 51 Buff. L.
Rev. 483 (2003) (presenting detailed account of several major sets of cases); Nimmer, supra note 49 (presenting
detailed account of intellectual property disputes over recreations and translations of ancient religious texts unearthed
in Israeli desert). But see Thomas F. Cotter, Gutenberg’s Legacy: Copyright, Censorship, and Religious Pluralism,
91 Cal. L. Rev. 323, 391 (2003) (arguing for greater court sensitivity to Free Exercise Clause values in copyright
disputes, including granting damages as opposed to injunctions, i.e. using “a liability instead of . . . .the more
common property rule regime.”).
53

See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Com. Svcs., 923 F. Supp 1231, 1239, 1248 n.19, 1249 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (issuing prelimarily injunction against former member of Church of Scientology who posted Church
writings on the Internet for the purpose of demonstrating their fallacies).

54

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (allowing “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment
....”). But see Religious Tech., 923 F. Supp. at 1249 (“Although criticism is a favored use, where that ‘criticism’
consists of copying large portions . . . .with often no more than one line of criticism, the fair use defense is
inappropriate.”).

55

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201.

56

David Lange and Jennifer Anderson voiced such a vision at the Duke Fair Use Conference of November 2001, but
then withheld their work-in-progress from publication pending further thought. I look forward to their insightful
explication. See Lange, supra note 41, at 479-82.
57

Historically, fair use was created by Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841),
simultaneously with gifting authors with a right to block derivative works. See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v.
Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. IPL 431 (1998); John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural Law
Copyright, working paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=486283 (visited Feb. 18,
2004). Absent the extension of authors’ power, fair use would have been unnecessary. The challenged down stream
works would not have been infringing.

unencumbered. The original meaning of the Progress Clause disallows copyright holders’
current ability to stifle derivative works.58 In many circumstances, the second author might
equitably be required to pay some royalty to the previous author. Neither transaction costs nor
unilaterally set fees, however, should be allowed to block dissemination of new works. Unlike
David Lange, however, my sympathy is not centered on later creators,59 my central concern is the
public, even those members of the public who are the most passive content consumers.60 The
original Progress Clause protects every hum-drum person’s ability to choose among the things of
imagination, bond with some, and then share the bond with others. The public domain is the
tool-kit of the highly creative, but it is also the shared imaginative realm of the entire public.61
Society is a network, sharing creates value. Professor Balkin makes the identical point from First
Amendment theory:
Freedom of speech is thus both individual and cultural. It is the ability to
participate in an ongoing system of culture creation through the various methods and
technologies of expression that exist at any particular point in time. Freedom of speech is
valuable because it protects important aspects of our ability to participate in the system of
culture creation.. . . 62

....
. . . The Internet teaches us that the free speech principle is about, and always has been
about, the promotion and development of a democratic culture.63
....
. . . A democratic culture is a participatory culture.64
58

See 17 U.S.C. 106 (“Subject to sections 107 through 121, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
right to do and to authorize any of the following . . . (2) to prepare derivative works.”).
59

See Lange, supra note 41, at 465.

60

As Internet public projects have demonstrated, the public is not composed of merely passive consumers. Working
together in a network, furthermore, the relatively non-creative can make substantial contributions to the
dissemination of culture. See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112
Yale L.J. 369 (2002) (explaining how Internet allows successful completion of large, complex projects by
networking multiple small inputs).
61

See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation,
67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 657 (1990) (discussing cultural use of marks); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols
and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20
Columbia-VLA Journal of Law and the Arts Winter 123 (1996) (same); Malla Pollack, Your Image is My Image, 14
Cardozo L. Rev. 1391, 1391-1448 (1993)(same).
62

See Balkin, supra note 2, at 6.

63

See id. at 44.

Like copyright, the patent statute would be drastically changed by the dissemination
reading. Under current law, a patent is a right to exclude others, not a right to practice one’s own
invention. One’s invention may be an improvement. To practice an improvement, one needs
permission from the holders of any patents covering underlying inventions. Patent, furthermore,
has neither a fair use exception65 nor an independent creation defense. Even the judicially
created experimental use exception from infringement may be defunct in practice.66 As with
copyright, if we take seriously the dissemination goal of the Progress Clause, and its underlying
theory that everyone should be encouraged to build on existing knowledge, patent holders should
not be allowed to block derivative works, a.k.a. improvement patents. Certainly research should
be encouraged.67
As for trademark and related doctrines, the dissemination meaning of the Progress Clause
should limit infringement to those cases where the mark is viewed by the public at the time of
alleged-infringement as the mark-holder’s indicia of origin. Without such “secondary meaning,”
confusion is impossible.68 Only provable likelihood of confusion justifies giving copyright-like
protection without copyright limitations. Why? Because, while marks are not required to be
64

See id. at 45.

65

See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1177, 1179-80
(2000) (arguing that patent statutes should be modified due to growing likelihood that patent holders will refuse to
license technology for socially efficient uses).

66

See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that exception did not include use of
invention in a non-profit university laboratory researching free electron lasers with no immediate commercial
application). While the Federal Circuit purported not to deligitimize the experimental use defense, see id. at 1360, it
limited the exception to investigations pursued “solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry,” id. at 1363. A research university’s research was held not to be “idle curiosity,” but rather
“furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business” objectives of “educating and enlightening students and
faculty,” “inceas[ing] the status of the institution,” and perhaps “lur[ing] lucrative research grants, students and
faculty.” Id. at 1362.

67

The concern for patent-holders’ blockade power against further research is not mere idle speculation. Ability to
block research was one core motive behind agribusiness’ push for utility patents to be available on sexually
reproducing plants. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc.
v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 129 n. 1(2001) (allowing utility patents as well as Plant Variety
Protection Act certificates on sexually reproducing plants, including basic food crops such as corn, while
acknowledging that the most notable difference between utility patent and PVPA protection is that “the PVPA
provides exemptions for research and for farmers to save seed from their crops for replanting.”). For detailed
discussion of the seed wars and their importance see the forthcoming publication of papers in the Journal of
Environmental Law & Litigation from “Malthus, Mendel, and Monsanto: Intellectual Property and the

Law and Politics of the Global Food Supply,” Univ. of Oregon, April 9, 2004.
68

See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000) (“without distinctiveness [a mark] would
not cause confusion . . . as the [statute] requires.”) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted); Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“It is the source-distinguishing ability of a mark . . . that permits it to
serve [a mark’s] basic purposes.”).

copyrightable subject matter,69 they commonly either are copyrightable subject matter or are
similar res failing the minimal originality standard required for copyright protection (such as
individual words and short phrases).70 This means the end of dilution doctrine71 and the end of
the non-rebutable presumption that incontestibly registered marks are not merely descriptive.72
Similarly, “trade-dress,” mark rights in product configurations, must be limited to prohibit
temporally unlimited patents (especially for res below the inventive level of inventions). At the
expiration of a patent, all would-be-competitors would be allowed to market the identical product
marketed under the patent privilege, provided they attach an accurate label.73 Even some
possibility of confusion should not be allowed to extend the constitutionally limited patent term.
Third, since constitutionally legitimate protection for “writings” and “discoveries” differ
in scope, the line between patent and copyright must be maintained.74 This constitutional
distinction underlies the fights over software protection. Software is a machine built of text.75
Was copyright in software an error? How far does software copyright protection protect? Should
software be patentable instead of copyrightable? Both? Neither?76
Fourth, courts should always make presumptions and decide doubtful cases against
would-be excluders. This would end, for example, the almost universal rule that a prima facie
69

See The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. (18 Otto) 82, 94 (1879) (holding that trademark statute is not within Progress
Clause power of Congress because most marks are neither copyrightable works nor patentable inventions).
70

See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Svc., 499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991) (holding that “writing” of an “author” requires only
a “minimal level of creativity.”).

71 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) provides “remedies for dilution of famous marks.” “The term ‘dilution’ means the lessening
of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence
of . . . .(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. See Brief of Malla Pollack, Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Mosely v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc, 123 S.Ct. 1115 (2003), available at 2002 WL
1404641 (raising First Amendment and Progress Clause concerns with dilution doctrine).
72

See Park N’ Fly Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 199-202 (holding that Lanham Act creates
irrebutable presumption that incontestibly registered marks have secondary meaning, even if marks are descriptive).

73

See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938) (holding that at expiration of a patent the
public acquires “the right to make the article as it was made during the patent period,” “the right to apply thereto the
name by which it had become known,” and “the good will of the article.”). But see TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.

Marketing Displays, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1255, 1263 (2001) (refusing to reach constitutional issue).
74 See Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (“To give the author of the book an exclusive property in the art
described therein, when no examination of novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud
upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright.”).
75

See Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor, & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2308, 2316 (1994)
(“[P]rograms are, in fact, machines (entities that bring about useful results, i.e., behavior) that
have been constructed in the medium of text (source and object code).”).
76

See, e.g., Dennis Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 439 (2003)
(discussing issue).

showing of copyright infringement triggers an assumption of irreparable harm, and, hence, a
preliminary injunction.77
Fifth, as discussed above, congressional expansions of the term of existing copyrights or
patents would be void attempts to take constitutionally-protected rights from the general public.
Sixth, someone who wishes to enforce his or her copyright in a work should be required
to place a conspicuous notice on every dissemination of the work. Absent such advance notice, a
copyright holder should be eligible for, at the very most, money damages limited to a royalty
compatible with the defendant’s profits (if any). Perhaps worse than term expansion, worse than
rights expansion, joining the Berne Convention has harmed the public’s ability to use
commercially non-viable copyrightable materials by optionalizing the C in the circle.78 The
dissemination core of the Progress Clause deplores the chilling effect of multiple, unknown,
possible holders of copyright power.79 Similarly, in patent, the requirement of notice would end
the doctrine of infringement by equivalents.80
In sum, reading the Progress Clause as originally written would revolutionize American
“intellectual property” and, to some degree, First Amendment doctrine by prioritizing people’s
access to writings and discoveries – everyday non-intellectual, non-investing, people – the
This is
posterity for whose general welfare and liberty the Constitution was ratified.81
precisely the lesson Professor Balkin learns about free speech principles from the Internet.
Concluding Reality Check
“We cannot get out! We cannot get out!”82 Not true. Berne,83 TRIPS,84 domestic
statutes,85 case law, and solicitude for prior investments86 block full implementation of the
See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 677 (9th Cir.) (“When a plaintiff is likely to
succeed on the merits of a copyright infringement claim, irreparable harm is presumed,” affirming grant of
preliminary injunction.); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Enter., 342 F.3d 191, 206 (3rd Cir.) (same), cert.
denied (Feb. 23, 2004; U.S. No. 03-763); Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d
94, 96 (2d Cir. 2002) (same). Cf. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147 (1998) (attacking ready availability of injunctions in intellectual
property cases on First Amendment grounds).
77

78

See 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (making notice optional). During discussion, Jessica Litman made this point forcefully at
the Duke Public Domain Conference, November 2001.

79

See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, Brief of Amici Curiae the American Assn. of Law Libraries, et. al., at 17-28
(arguing burden of looking for copyright holders in order to obtain permissions), available at 2002 WL 1059710.

80

But see Warner-Jenkinson Co., v. Hilton Davis Chem., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (refusing to limit patent
infringement to literal form even though “[t]here can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied
broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement.”).
81

See U.S. Const. Preamble (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.”).

82

J. R. R. Tolkein, The Lord of the Rings, Part I, The Fellowship of the Ring, Chapter 5, “The Bridge of KhazadDûm,” at 419 (Ballantine Books pbk. 1965 printing) (warning from final records of the dwarf kingdom of Moria).

Drafters’ vision. However, we can choose to turn in the right direction at each future fork in the
road.87 Many are coming.

83

See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works Art. 5(2) (Paris Text 1971) (“The
enjoyment and the exercise of these [copy]rights shall not be subject to any formality . . .. .”).

84

See, e.g., Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade § 1, Art. 9(1) (April 15, 1994) (“Members shall comply with
Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) . . .”).

85

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal
property.”); id. at § 271(d) (“No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by
reason of his having done one or more of the following: . . . (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent.”).

86

See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 41 (“I address in particular the application of the presumption in this
case and others in which patent prosecution has already been completed. The new presumption, if applied woodenly,
might in some instances unfairly discount the expectations of a patentee who had no notice at the time of patent
prosecution that such a presumption would apply.”) (Ginsberg, J., concurring).

87

For example, we can decline to enact the currently pending “Database and Collections of Information
Misappropriation Act” (H.R. 3261 ), and the also pending “Author, Consumer, and Computer Owner Protection and
Security Act of 2003" (H.R. 2752).

